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residence requirements" condition or penalize free movement by
placing the new resident in a state at a disadvantage in comparison
with the long-time resident. The right-to-travel standard which has
emerged from Shapiro and Dunn would now seem to make use of
these devices for any purpose highly suspect.26
Consumer Protection- TRUTH IN LENDING - DISCLOSURE AT REAL
ESTATE CLOSING Is NOT TIMELY AND FRUSTRATES THE PURPOSE
OF THE FEDERAL TRUTH IN LENDING AcT.-Bissette v. Colonial
Mortgage Corp., 340 F. Supp. 1191 (D.D.C. 1972).
The Calvin Bissettes entered into an agreement with a builder-
developer for the purchase of a one-family home, the agreement con-
25. Waiting periods applicable to new arrivals in a state may not in terms be
"durational" residence requirements. They may rather purport to distinguish residents
from nonresidents, creating an irrebuttable presumption of nonresidence so far as en-
titlement to some particular benefit is concerned. The Court has thus far dealt only
with durational residence requirements and has been careful to emphasize that fact.
In Dunn, for example, the Court stated that "[n]othing said today is meant to cast
doubt on the validity of appropriately defined and uniformly applied bona fide resi-
dence requirements." 405 U.S. at 342 n.13. The question arises whether a state can
distinguish residents from nonresidents in terms of presence within the state for a
period of time without in effect creating a durational residence requirement that would
then be subject to testing by the compelling state interest standard. Certainly states
which have a less burdensome test of bona fide residence-like Tennessee's "intention
to stay indefinitely in a place" coupled with "some objective indication consistent with
that intent"- will experience logical difficulty in explaining why a resident-nonresident
classification in terms of time within the state is anything other than a durational
residence requirement by another name.
26. Out-of-state tuition differentials represent one of the most widely used and
economically significant forms of durational residence requirement. See generally Note,
The Constitutionality of Nonresident Tuition, 55 MINN. L. REv. 1139 (1971). Attacks
on tuition differentials have generally been unsuccessful. See, e.g., Starns v. Malkerson,
326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 401 U.S. 985 (1971); Kirk v. Board
of Regents, 273 Cal. App. 2d 430, 78 Cal. Rptr. 260 (Cal. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1969), appeal
dismissed, 396 U.S. 554 (1970); Bryan v. Regents, 188 Cal, 559, 205 Pac. 107 (1922);
Commentary, 24 ALA. L. Rav. 147 (1971); But see Kline v. Vlandis, 346 F. Supp. 526 (D.
Conn. 1972). In the Starns case, the Court in a memorandum opinion affirmed a district
court's application of the traditional "rational relation" equal protection test to uphold a
Minnesota statute which created "an irrebuttable presumption that any person who
has not continuously resided in Minnesota for one year immediately before his entrance
to the University is a nonresident for tuition purposes." 326 F. Supp. at 237. Shapiro
was distinguished by the district court in two respects: the court found no significant
evidence that the claimants' right to travel had actually been deterred, and Shapiro
was said to involve immediate and pressing needs relating to the preservation of life
and health. Id. at 237-38. But the Starns affirmance came before Dunn. Given the Court's
rejection in Dunn of an actual deterrence requirement and its careful elaboration of
the right to travel as an independent basis necessitating application of the compelling
state interest test, it seems improbable that the Starns rationale will be adequate to
dispose of this issue should it again come before the Court.
CASE COMMENTS
tingent upon financing. The Bissettes then applied for a mortgage
loan with Colonial Mortgage Corporation. On November 23, 1970,
they were notified by Colonial that their loan application had re-
ceived FHA approval. After executing a pre-possession agreement,
with the builder-developer, the Bissettes moved into their new home
on December 2, 1970. The disclosures required by the Truth in
Lending Act, as implemented by Federal Reserve Board Regulation Z,2
were not made by the mortgagee until closing, three weeks later. Mr.
and Mrs. Bissette subsequently instituted a class action seeking a
declaration that the mortgage company's actions were in violation of
the Act. Damages were also sought.8 The District Court for the
District of Columbia, in a case of first impression, held that disclosure
at real estate closing was not timely and frustrated the purpose of
the Act.
The Act requires that disclosure in certain mortgage transactions
be made "before the credit is extended."' Regulation Z specifies that
disclosure be made "before the transaction is consummated." Con-
summation occurs "at the time a contractual relationship is created
between a creditor and a customer irrespective of the time of per-
1. A pre-possession agreement is one between a vendor and vendee allowing the
latter to take possession prior to closing. For a discussion of these agreements see M.
FRIEDMAN, CONTRACTS AND CONVEYANCES OF REAL PROPERTY 351-59 (2d ed. 1963).
2. 82 Stat. 146 (1968), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-65 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as the Act].
Pursuant to § 1604, the Federal Reserve Board has implemented the Act by promulgating
Fed. Res. Bd. Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1-.1002 (1972) [hereinafter referred to as Regulation
Z]. Items required to be disclosed are set out in detail on the standard form for real
property loans supplied by the Federal Reserve Board. The principal data required
are the prepaid finance charge, the finance charge expressed in dollars, charges exclud-
able from the finance charge, and the finance charge expressed as an annual percentage
rate. See generally Aldridge, Truth-in-Lending in Real Estate Transactions, 48 N.C.L. REv.
427 (1970).
3. 82 Stat. 157 (1968), 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (a) (1970) provides that any creditor who
fails to make required disclosures is liable to the borrower
in an amount equal to the sum of (1) twice the amount of the finance charge
in connection with the transaction, except that the liability under this paragraph
shall not be less than $100 nor greater than $1000; and (2) in the case of any
successful action to enforce the foregoing liability, the costs of the action together
with a reasonable attorney's fee as determined by the court.
4. 82 Stat. 156 (1968), 15 U.S.C. § 1639 (b) (1970). This provision is made applicable,
inter alia, to all real property transactions in which there is an offer or extension of con-
sumer credit by a creditor to a natural person for personal consumer use and in which a
security interest "is or will be retained or acquired." Fed. Res. Bd. Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R.
§ 226.2 (k), (x) (1972). For a thorough discussion of the application of the Act to real
property transactions, see Aldridge, supra note 2, at 428-32.
5. 12 C.F.R. § 226.8 (a) (1972). One commentator has expressed the view that "before
the transaction is consumated" is not synonymous with "before the credit is extended."
Aldridge, supra note 2 at 442-43,
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formance of either party." Read literally, the Act and Regulation Z
seem only to require that disclosure be made at any time before the
credit relationship is created by contract. The Bissette court rejected
the literal interpretation in favor of one that it thought achieved the
purpose disclosure requirements were intended to serve.
The Bissettes argued that a contract was "consummated" when
Colonial informed them of FHA loan approval, and that subsequent
disclosures failed to satisfy the Act's directives. Alternatively, they
urged that even if there was no enforceable contract prior to closing,
"disclosure at closing is too late to be 'meaningful' under the Act. ' ' 7
Colonial advanced four arguments in support of its assertion that
disclosure at closing was timely. First, it contended that the phrase
"before the credit is extended" means any time before it is extended,
and that no credit had been extended prior to the closing. The court
responded that "[s]uch an interpretation is in direct conflict with the
essential purpose of this legislation."" That reading would permit
creditors to make disclosure too late for the borrower to make effec-
tive use of the information. Secondly, Colonial urged that the language
of the Act permitting disclosure "in the note or other evidence of
indebtedness to be signed by the obligor'' authorizes disclosure when
the debtor executes the loan document. But the court interpreted
this language to specify only the manner and not the time at which
disclosure should be made. Thirdly, the mortgagee contended that
disclosure prior to closing is impossible because all the requisite in-
formation would not be available. In reply, the court cited the section
of Regulation Z10 allowing the creditor to estimate unknown amounts
and items that must be disclosed and observed that "most of the
information disclosed by defendant on closing day was ascertainable
well in advance of that time."' 1 Finally, it was argued that the
words "before the credit is extended" are ambiguous and do not lend
themselves to a rule specifying the time of disclosure.
The court held for the Bissettes12 on the strength of their alterna-
6. Fed. Res. Bd. Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(cc) (1972). The actual date of consum-
mation is fixed by those provisions of state contract law that determine when a "con-
tractual relationship is created." Id. In an opinion letter dated June 19, 1969, Frederic
Solomon, Director of the Federal Reserve Board, stated: "Mhe date of consummation
is fixed by State law, that is, the State law of contracts would determine when that
'contractual relationship' arose." 4 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 30,070 (1970).
7. 340 F. Supp. at 1192.
8. Id. at 1193.
9. 82 Stat. 156 (1968), 15 U.S.C. § 1639(b) (1970).
10. 12 C.F.R. § 226.6(f) (1972).
11. 340 F. Supp. at 1194.
12. The court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment but withheld assess-
ment of damages pending determination of the propriety of the class. Id.
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tive argument. Declining to establish a time-of-disclosure rule, the
court said "[a]ll that is required and all this Court concludes is that
Truth in Lending disclosures made only at closing frustrate the
Congressional intent and basic purpose of the Act, and as such, con-
stitute a violation thereof. '' 3
The purpose of the Act is "to assure a meaningful disclosure of
credit terms." 14 Requiring early disclosure of borrowing costs pro-
vides the consumer information with which to select rationally the
lender offering the most favorable rates.15 It is supposed that this
revelation will partly "avoid the uninformed use of credit," and that
it will promote credit rate comparisons. 6 The Act was further de-
signed to insure that "economic stabilization [will] be enhanced and
. . . [that] competition among the various financial institutions . . .
[will] be strengthened .... ."I7
The Bissette court concluded that disclosure at closing frustrates
"comparison shopping.""' This conclusion was reached even though
consummation had evidently not occurred (although the court did
not resolve this question). "Comparison shopping" requires that in-
formation be supplied early in credit negotiations while the borrower
is relatively uncommitted. Although the purchaser may not be legally
bound by the time he comes to the real estate closing, he may be
too committed to the transaction, and he may have made incidental
expenditures in anticipation of purchase. In Bissette, for example,
13. Id.
14. 82 Stat. 146 (1968), U.S.C. § 1601 (1970). See also Fed. Res. Bd. Reg. Z, 12
C.F.R. § 226.1 (a) (2) (1972); S. REP. No. 392, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1967); Ratner v.
Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270, 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
15. But see Jensen, Effect of Federal Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z on
Real Estate, 4 REAL PROPERTY PROBLEMS AND TRUST J. 11, 28 (1969) (In his conclusion, the
author says the Act "will not materially change the information presently obtained
by borrowers in a first mortgage transaction.").
16. See 82 Stat. 146 (1968), 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1970).
17. Id. The statement is evidently founded upon the tenet of conventional economic
theory that informed buyers will patronize sellers who offer the most attractive price (or
interest rate), thereby "shaking out" the inefficient and overpriced firms. Cf. Alfred,
Fair Market Value Concept, 14 W. REs. L. REv. 173, 175 (1963); Knauss, A Reappraisal
of the Role of Disclosure, 62 MICH. L. REv. 607, 610 (1964). Writing on the disclosure
obligations imposed on issuers of securities, Knauss states: "The less information avail-
able, the less the market price will be representative of . . . true value .... " But see
Shafton, Truth-in-Lending, 23 Bus. LAW. 511 (1968) (discussing the Act's ill effects on the
mortgage finance industry); Note, Truth in Lending: The Impossible Dream, 22 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 89, 108 (1970) (examining the flaws in the argument that Truth in
Lending will enhance economic stability).
18. 340 F. Supp. at 1194. The court said: "[Borrowers] merely want a clear indication
of the cost . . . [of the loan], so they can decide for themselves whether the charges are
reasonable and have the opportunity, if they wish, to compare that cost with other avail-
able credit arrangements."
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the plaintiffs had already moved into the home. They were hardly
objective or uncommitted shoppers on the day of closing.
Disclosure consistent with the purpose of the Act could be made-
and the Bissette decision complied with-in at least two ways. First,
the lender could obtain a firm commitment 9 from the prospective
borrower before closing but after loan approval. Since the commit-
ment would apparently be a "consummation"20 under Regulation Z,
disclosure would be required prior to its execution. To assure that
disclosure upon the execution of a firm commitment does not meet
with the same fate as disclosure at closing, the lender could make
disclosure as soon as the loan is approved, simultaneously offering to
the borrower the terms of the firm commitment. One of the terms
could be that acceptance of the commitment must be made
within ten days but no sooner than three days after the offering. In
this way, the loan would be approved and full disclosure made before
actual execution of the commitment.
Secondly, disclosure could be made immediately upon the filing
of a loan application or soon thereafter.2 ' This procedure would be
in full accord with the spirit of the Act and would allow the con-
sumer to shop for mortgage rates much as he is now able to shop
for goods.
Both proposals require the creditor to use the provision of Regula-
tion Z22 permitting estimation of items disclosed. This provision
directs the lender first to make a reasonable effort to ascertain the
unknown data. If the information cannot be determined, an estimate
can be made provided it "is clearly identified as such, is reasonable,
19. A firm commitment is an agreement in which a lender promises to provide a
mortgage loan on specified terms subject to certain conditions. The borrower may pay
a fixed fee to the lender should the borrower decide not to accept, or he may promise
to reimburse him for the cost of processing the loan application up to the date on
which the borrower rejects the loan. See generally PRACTICING LAW INnTr , REAL
ESTATE FINANCING: BUSINESS AND LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS 112-35 (J. McCord ed. 1970).
20. In an opinion letter dated Aug. 27, 1969, Frederic Solomon, Director of the
Federal Reserve Board, stated: "[C]onsummation would occur at the time the lender
issued its permanent loan commitment to the purchasing customer and the purchasing
customer accepted such commitment." 4 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 30,147 (1970).
21. This time for disclosure has been recommended to bankers. See Frank, Prepara-
tion of Bank Forms for Regulation Z, 87 BANK L.J. 307, 323 (1970).
22. Fed. Res. Bd. Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.6(f) (1972). The estimation provision
may create an inequity between competing lenders. The span of time between execution
of the loan and closing may differ among borrowers, but it is an item that must be
estimated and disclosed. Since the borrower will be required to pay interest over this
period, the estimation could have considerable impact on the borrower's decision of
where to do business. The candid lender is at a disadvantage against an unduly con-
servative competitor whose estimate of time-to-closing is less than forthright. Accordingly,
the Federal Reserve Board could eliminate this problem by providing for a standard
estimate of time-to-closing.
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is based on the best information available to the creditor, and is not
used for the purpose of circumventing or evading the disclosure re-
quirements . "..."23 As the Bissette court said, "[pilaintiffs do not
seek, nor does the Act require, full and complete disclosure of each
and every detail of the entire credit transaction. 2 4 All that is required
is a forthright indication of the cost of borrowing, allowing the con-
sumer to decide for himself if the rate is reasonable and the best
available.
Criminal Law- SEARCH WARRANT - HEROIN SEIZED IN BACKYARD
INCIDENT TO ARREST OF DEFENDANT IN His APARTMENT HELD AD-
MISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE.-Fixel v. State, 256 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1971), cert. denied, 262 So. 2d 443 (Fla. 1972).
During a surveillance of defendant Robert Fixel's apartment and
backyard, an officer of the Key West police saw a number of persons-
later characterized by the appeal court as "known pushers"-enter
defendant's apartment. Another officer observed that several times
defendant went to a pile of debris in his backyard, removed some-
thing from a black zipper bag, and took it into his apartment. A
warrant to search the apartment was secured. One officer then went
to the front door and arrested Fixel while another picked up the bag
from the debris pile in the fenced-in backyard. The bag was found
to contain heroin. The police were unable to find any narcotics in the
apartment itself. The heroin seized in the backyard was admitted
at trial, and defendant was convicted of possession of heroin. On appeal,
the district court affirmed the conviction, stating that "Coolidge v.
New Hampshire . . . does not require a reversal in this case inasmuch
as that opinion recognizes that not every seizure of evidence which
is not supported by a warrant is unconstitutional."' The Florida
Supreme Court denied certiorari.2
The Fixel decision arguably misconstrues the import of Coolidge
v. New Hampshire.3 The law has long recognized that not all searches
and seizures need be authorized by a warrant. The significance of
Coolidge was not in its recognition of this principle but rather in
its discussion of the situations in which the warrant requirement
23. Id.
24. 340 F. Supp. at 1194.
1. 256 So. 2d at 28.
2. 262 So. 2d 443 (Fla. 1972).
3. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
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